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The Monad and the Cut in Samuel Beckett’s Endgame 
 
Llewellyn Brown 
 
Introduction 
The various systems or “world-views” offered by philosophical elaborations promise an 
imaginary coherency which many readers have sought to identify in Beckett’s work, 
interpreting the latter, for example, as expressive of the human condition in a Godless age, or 
in the aftermath of the Shoah. Endgame in particular has been said to offer the image of a 
post-apocalyptic world and, without going so far, it is doubtless possible to discern in this 
play elements of a “world” and a “story.” However, this text in no way comforts a perception 
that the elements presented might fit together into an overall meaningful picture. When 
questioned, Beckett forcefully rejected any suggestion of a world-view,1  and rather than 
reinforcing any imaginary consistency, his work is constantly marked by omnipresent cuts 
and breaks.  
If “false starts” (Beckett in Harmon 139), interruptions and breaches are so crucial to 
Beckett, they also echo similar preoccupations in psychoanalysis. Indeed, the latter insistently 
points to – and integrates into its practice – the cut, which serves to break down the imaginary 
register – marked by its syntactical articulations and the resulting dimension of meaning – and 
to bring into play the absence of meaning – the hors sens– anchored in the real. Indeed, Lacan 
situates the subject not as a conscious agent, but as one that is both produced and effaced by 
the signifier. As explained in Seminar VI, the subject’s relationship to the real – which is “not 
symbolised by anything” (471) – is caused by a cut that has nothing to do with natural ones 
(474), since it is “the ultimate [dernier] structural characteristic of the symbolic as such” and 
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therefore points to the subject’s “pure being as a subject” (471), where the death drive “can be 
found to converge with being.” 
The dimension of the real involved thus radically resists meanings, conceptualisation or 
even – in the ultimate formalisation Lacan gives to it – truth, the latter remaining determined 
by discursive structures, where the manifestations of the subject remain evanescent. For this 
very reason, psychoanalysis and anything pointing to the cut is less and less tolerated in our 
postmodern age2, making it particularly deserving of our investigations. In the following 
lines, we propose to study Beckett’s 1957 play Endgame in the light of the cut, in order to 
establish the latter’s manifestations and function, involving the real.  
 
A Closed Monad 
What Beckett seems to present in Endgame as the fundamentally problematic situation in 
language is one where the cut is absent. Indeed, the stage setting appears as a coherent whole, 
which is strangely stylised and markedly removed from any of the components of what one 
would conceive of as composing a “world.” It is a self-contained universe – a characteristic 
marking its affinity with the imaginary register –, which is nonetheless set apart from 
conventional reality. 
The spectator encounters the image of a rather bare room – often associated with the 
interior of a skull –, which presents an imaginary continuity, devoid of any real breach, 
producing a rather disquieting impression. The place is called a “refuge” (Complete Dramatic 
Works 93) or “shelter” (in Harmon 23)– significantly echoed in the two ashbins where the 
parents, Nagg and Nell, are confined–, which Hamm sees as his final place: “There I’ll be, in 
the old refuge, alone against the silence and… [he hesitates]… the stillness.” (Complete 
Dramatic Works 126). 
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However, in contradiction with the notion of a world-view, the existence of any space 
beyond the room’s walls remains problematic. Indeed, if the original drafts for the play 
described various realistic components3, the latter were subsequently eliminated, leaving only 
vague residual traces, such as the sand collected by Clov on the shore to line the parents’ 
ashbins4 (Complete Dramatic Works 100). This process of paring the visual or referential 
dimension down brings the setting closer to its structural truth. It may be objected that Hamm 
does speak of an outside, declaring the walls to be an uncertain source of protection: “Hollow 
bricks! […] All that’s hollow!” (104). As for the external world: “Outside of here it’s death.” 
(96; cf. 126); “Beyond is the… other hell.” (104). The use of the term without (106) is 
deliberately equivocal, undermining the conventional geometrical opposition – determined by 
an imaginary cut – between inside and out, and pointing rather to the similarity, or to a degree 
of equivalence between the two. Indeed, the within (significantly, never termed such) would 
seem to be profoundly structured by the “without”, the latter being only the Mœbian reverse 
side of the former. This perception would seem to be corroborated by one declaration Beckett 
made elsewhere: “The trouble about my little world is that there is no outside to it.”5 
As for the within, it appears as a prison whence Clov aspires to escape, as he says to 
himself in his final monologue: “[…] Clov, you must be there better than that if you want 
them to let you go – one day” (Complete Dramatic Works 132). Such a flight remains 
problematic, since Clov describes the “without” as in no way composing a world: “I open the 
door of the cell and go. I am so bowed I only see my feet, if I open my eyes, and between my 
legs a little trail of black dust. I say to myself that the earth is extinguished, though I never 
saw it lit” (132). While the “refuge” appears as a smooth, closed space, the outside is by no 
means a world furnished with a living reality: it is endless powder and dust. In either case, the 
absence of any structuring cut is apparent. For this reason, Clov is indeed frightfully free to 
leave, since there is no Other capable of condemning him to any sentence, a condition that 
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would offer the advantage of pointing to the outside as a place of freedom. On the contrary, 
he remains under the weight of an endless and undefined culpability he can, therefore, never 
atone for.  
The “refuge” thus has an equivocal status. It assumes an imaginary form, being 
exaggeratedly unified – or, rather, uniform – but, at the same time, it negates any possibility 
of being situated in reference to shared reality. Consequently, the appearance it composes 
must be seen as having its equivalent in the real. As such, it points to – while seeming to 
dissimulate, by means of its enveloping qualities – what the characters experience as the 
unlimited “pain of existing” (Lacan Écrits, 777), which allows for no escape, unless it be by 
recourse to saying, in order to create a breach. This condition can be seen in the light of 
Lacan’s explanation of the signifier as producing the subject and, at the same time, reducing 
the latter “to being no longer anything other than a signifier” (Séminaire XI 188). This 
petrifaction is inscribed however in the “temporal pulsation where the initial characteristic of 
the unconscious as such – closure” (189), also termed aphanisis or fading – is instituted. This 
original inscription in existence as an effect of the signifier is impossible to escape from, since 
it holds in its sway all subsequent choices made by the subject: be it the very desire to opt out 
of life.  
On the surface, life in the “refuge” takes the form of extreme monotony, reflecting the 
stage set: “All life long the same questions, the same answers” (Complete Dramatic Works 
94). However, this seemingly unbreachable sameness is, in turn, the manifest face of the 
unbearable dimension of existence. Hamm asks Clov: “Have you not had enough? […] Of 
this… this… thing.” (94; cf. 114).  The “thing” they find themselves plunged into is a quod 
for which they are unable to define the quid: they know there is something – but even that is 
inadequate, as shown by the aposiopesis in the sentence –, but are totally unable to say what it 
is. They are caught up in an unidentifiable and uncontrollable movement that causes them 
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extreme anxiety: “HAMM [Anguished]: What’s happening, what’s happening? / CLOV: 
Something is taking its course.” (98; cf. 107). This something therefore is of the order of 
stifling continuity, devoid of any vivifying breach.  
However, the apparently opposed expression is also possible. Jean-Claude Milner points 
out that the One as real – as such, detached from any property – is ascribed various 
contradictory (and necessarily inadequate) metaphors: “[…] the atom or the fixed star, but 
also the fine cloud, the cluster, the heap, flocculation […].” (Les Noms indistincts 29). Infinite 
and ungraspable fragmentation describes the same state, as we find expressed in Clov’s 
opening words: “Finished, it’s finished, nearly finished, it must be nearly finished. [Pause.] 
Grain upon grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, there’s a heap, a little heap, the 
impossible heap.” (Complete Dramatic Works 93). The expanding sentence structure 
illustrates the impossibility of achieving a cutting-off or ‘quilting’ point (point de capiton) 
capable of retroactively inscribing a signification, and giving substance to the signifier life, as 
Hamm states, referring perhaps to Protagoras6: “…that old Greek, and all life long you wait 
for that to mount up to a life”7 (126). Saying only pushes the term further off. This experience 
is indicated by Beckett concerning Clov’s initial inspection of the place: “C perplexed. All 
seemingly in order, yet a change. Fatal grain added to form impossible heap. Ratio ruentis 
acervi.” (Theatrical Notebook II 47). This echoes the earlier perception by Arsène of 
something indescribable having slipped:  
 
The change. In what did it consist? It is hard to say. Something slipped. […] There is a 
great alp of sand, one hundred metres high, between the pines and the ocean, and there 
in the warm moonless night, when no one is looking, no one listening, in tiny packets 
of two or three millions the grains slip all together, and then stop, all together, not one 
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missing […] millions of little things moving all together out of their old place, into a 
new one nearby, and furtively, as though it were forbidden. (Watt 42–3) 
 
This imperceptible movement of countless minute units escapes seeing and definition, 
revealing the endless chain of the signifier, painfully brought to the fore by the absence of the 
“assent of the Other” (Lacan Séminaire VIII, 414) which alone could bring it to a halt by 
means of an identification. Indeed, the internalising of the gaze of the Other would create a 
breach between what remains inaccessible to the subject, and what could create an order of 
the perceptible.  
 
Exclusion from the Phallic Register 
One major cut thus becomes apparent between the inexplicable state where the characters find 
themselves, and the phallic register. The phallus is understood as “the signifier destined to 
indicate as a whole the effects of signified” (Lacan Écrits, 690). This definition is later 
followed up in Lacan’s formulæ of sexuation, where the phallus is logically founded as a 
limited whole, by the exclusion of an element. Thus the formula defining the inscription of 
the subject in the realm of the universal – “for all x, Fx” (Séminaire XX 73)– is necessarily 
grounded in the exception: “there exists an x not Fx.” The exception thus inscribes a border, 
and the part that is excluded remains the foundation of the whole, in the terms of the 
(modified) expression “the exception founds the rule.” The excluded objet a allows itself to 
be ignored, serving to consolidate the illusion of a substantial reality as an echo of the 
individual ego. Moreover, at the expense of the exception, the phallus affords a dialectical 
mediation between one and its Other, since both sexes situate themselves in reference to it. 
Lacan thus states that the sexual rapport “is not without a third term, which is properly 
speaking the phallus” (Séminaire XVIII 142). 
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Around the “refuge” in Endgame, there is no “world”, and any reference to it remains 
extremely tenuous. The allusions made by the characters appear as strictly isolated fragments 
or vignettes, which we can examine at present. Regarding these allusions, it might be argued 
that the characters of Endgame are situated within the confines of a world, since Clov 
describes scenes he purportedly perceives through the two windows. However, nothing in his 
evocations accredits this evaluation. The windows manifestly function as signifiers in a binary 
left/right composition, giving a view of land and sea respectively. This distribution is 
underscored, for example, when Clov answers Hamm’s question: “What window is it? / The 
earth” (Complete Dramatic Works 123). The only access to such reality is through the 
windows, which appear as purely conventional devices. The view supposedly seen by Clov is 
more of a verbal construct than a description: “The light is sunk” (106). This is particularly 
true in the French original, which plays on the rhyme fanal::canal (Fin de partie 47). Again, 
Clov asks if Hamm wants him to describe any “particular sector” (Complete Dramatic Works 
128), or: “The general effect?” Indeed, in the final analysis, the “refuge” appears as a 
Leibnizian windowless monad: the presence of the windows as a visual and verbal motif 
points precisely to the fact that the characters do not enjoy the subjective function of the 
“window” (fenêtre8) – that of the fundamental fantasy – capable of framing a singular reality. 
The windows therefore function rather as points of blankness, where the view evoked remains 
devoid of any extension that may give access to a coherent or believable reality. Thus, the 
spectator has no direct perception of the vista they are supposed to offer: only Clov’s words 
give any idea of what may be “without.” In fact, the evocations of these scenes are intended to 
act as substitute openings, breaking the monotony reigning in the shelter: “What’s the weather 
like? / The same as usual. / Look at the earth. […] No need of the glass. / Look at it with the 
glass” (Complete Dramatic Works 105). 
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 The windows are also cut off from the characters: not only is Hamm himself blind (he 
too relying on Clov’s accounts), but in order to look through them, Clov needs to cross over 
the stage, and use a ladder to reach them (Complete Dramatic Works 106). In addition, he 
views the supposed scene through a telescope. This accumulation of prostheses points not to 
the existence of a visible reality but, on the contrary, to its total and radical evacuation. What 
Clov sees at one point is literally nothing: “Let’s see. [He looks, moving the telescope.] 
Zero… [he looks]…zero… [he looks]… and zero” (106). This insistence on Clov’s behalf 
could also point to the delight he takes in thwarting Hamm’s will. What remains operational is 
the minimal – and ever problematic – action involved in moving from one point to another.  
The structured function of the window – based on the unary trait (trait unaire), as an 
internalisation of the gaze of the Other – is materialised not in the cut, as such, but in the 
notch (entaille; Séminaire XI 187): it renders visible the invisible mark of the signifier.9 
However its problematic nature testifies to the way castration is generalised in melancholy.10 
The same principle applies to Hamm’s sporadic evocations of nature. Like Pozzo before 
him, in Waiting for Godot, Hamm is ironically associated with the status of a wealthy 
property-owner, who speaks of Clov’s “rounds”: “When you inspected my paupers” 
(Complete Dramatic Works 96). In his “chronicle” too, he speaks of his preparations for the 
“festivities” (117) of Christmas Eve.  
 If this story is pointedly fictional, his other mentions of nature are also limited to the 
verbal realm. Upon awaking, at the beginning of the play, he exclaims: “What dreams! Those 
forests!” (Complete Dramatic Works 93). His dreams afford him the idea of a reality that is 
excluded from the fundamental situation that is his in the refuge. A whole delicious world 
opens up in his dreams, complete with a human partner and bucolic surroundings: “If I could 
sleep I might make love. I’d go into the woods. My eyes would see… the sky, the earth” 
(100). His exclamations offer fleeting lyrical images of an idealistic world, marked by irony 
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with regards to his real condition: “Flora! Pomona!” (111). Rather than entering a syntactical 
construction – lending credence to belief in reality – the images are fragmentary, disjointed, 
with intentionally bookish connotations.  
Rather than pointing to the real existence of an outside world, these evocations thus 
belong to what Beckett calls “escape mechanisms11”: means by which the characters seek to 
situate a possible – hypothetical – attachment to an Other. This is what is referred to when 
Hamm asks Clov if he has had his visions, and the latter replies: “Less” (Complete Dramatic 
Works 112). As Beckett explains (in Harmon 22), these visions are associated with Clov’s 
“light dying” (98); Hamm having just asked him, ironically, what he sees on his kitchen wall: 
“Mene, mene? Naked bodies?” (98). In other words, he denounces any “visions” Clov may 
have had as being simply vain fantasies (concerning destiny or erotic union) aiming to cover 
up an inescapable situation.  
 
Stasis of the Monad 
There is thus a marked cut between objects belonging to the phallic register – supporting 
desire in the context of the fantasy, and which corresponds to what Beckett calls “traversable 
space” (Complete Short Prose 111) – and the environment depicted by the stage setting. What 
dominates in the refuge is stasis rather than movement, particularly in the character of Hamm. 
The latter’s “chronicle” opens up to an indefinite expansion of the world and humanity: “All 
those I might have helped. […] Saved. […] The place was crawling with them.” (Complete 
Dramatic Works 125). However, his refusal to help his fellows points to his radical 
incapability of conceiving of any community, or the interest of saving anyone from the real 
problem of existence: “Use your head, can’t you, use your head, you’re on earth, there’s no 
cure for that!” (125). Such is the function of his blindness, which expresses his incapability of 
endowing existence with form and colour. It could be said of Hamm’s eyes that they represent 
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the source of the “evil” inherent in existence, as evoked in Ill Seen Ill Said: “Implying 
furthermore that it the culprit. And from it as from an evil core that the what is the wrong 
word the evil spread.” (46). 
Indeed, Hamm is situated in a metonymical continuity with the space of the refuge. 
Supposedly, he took in Clov as a child, a fact which leads him to declare: “My house a home 
for you. […] But for Hamm, [gesture towards surroundings] no home.” (Complete Dramatic 
Works, 111). This “world” is shrinking, being constantly pared down, and the underlying 
experience is, as Hamm admits, that of an absence of being: “I was never there.” (128). This 
inspires his angered insistence on being placed both approximately and exactly in the centre: 
“I was right in the centre, wasn’t I?” (104); “Roughly! Roughly! […] Bang in the centre!” 
(105). The enveloping environment of the refuge only testifies to the absence of any place 
wherein the characters could find reassurance of being. For this reason, Hamm relies on Clov 
as an alter ego, to provide him with the impression that there may be a substantial reality, if 
only in the presence of another speaking creature.  
The refuge as a monad, while seemingly offering a place of stability, suggests that a 
structuring cut must be situated somewhere in the symbolic register.  
 
“Come and Go” 
It is striking that this play’s construction rests on the mobilisation of pairs, notably in the roles 
of Hamm and Clov. The opposition between these two characters is underscored by various 
motifs: Hamm cannot stand, while Clov cannot sit (Complete Dramatic Works 97); Hamm is 
blind, while Clov can see; Hamm is “father,” and Clov is his adoptive “son.” Far from 
comforting any idea of complementarity, this underscores its absence: the fundamental breach 
between the partners. If the “signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier”12, the 
pair of signifiers S1"S2 are, as Lacan develops in his “four discourses,” marked by an 
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impossibility.13 Such, for example, is the impossibility for the Master to put the labourer to 
work.  
This fundamental dual arrangement structures incessant movement, as if to counter the 
fixity of the refuge. However, this motion is not dialectical in nature: one that would be 
capable of subsuming any negativity by raising it toward a higher unity or accomplishment. 
Rather, it borders on a radical cut. This movement is described in the incipit of A Piece of 
Monologue: “Birth was the death of him. […] From mammy to nanny and back. All the way. 
Bandied back and forth. So ghastly grinning on” (Complete Dramatic Works 425). This 
passage situates birth as marked by the “lethal alternative” (Séminaire XI 191): the signifier 
that gives life also inflicts death. This original cut is transferred or carried over to the “come 
and go” movement between two maternal figures, in an oscillation that remains without any 
resolution, in the absence of any subsuming by the phallic register. This is why the character 
continues to go “on”, bearing the mark of his original mortification. In Hamm’s words: “The 
end is in the beginning and yet you go on” (Complete Dramatic Works126). Freud’s fort/da 
game of the spool (Beyond the Pleasure Principle) – with which we can associate this 
movement – does not lead to a dialectic capable of covering up the absence; on the contrary, it 
leaves the gaping hole open, inscribed by the cut of the signifier. As Henri Rey-Flaud points 
out: “The rapport between the right hand and the left hand, between fort and da, between 
masculine and feminine is, as a fact, impossible to write, since language cannot signify itself 
[…]” (28 n. 3). 
Indeed, Lacan explains: “For the game of the spool is the subject’s response to what the 
absence of the mother has come to create on the frontier of his domain, on the edge of his cot, 
that is to say a gulf, around which there is nothing to do but play the game of the leap” 
(Séminaire XI 60). This means that even if one succeeds in negotiating the hole, there remains 
the fundamental non-negotiable gulf, and the response by a subjective leap which concerns 
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the subject as an a object, whereby it is a matter of “being the fort of a da, and the da of a 
fort” (61), the dimension that is not represented.  
As Pierre Fédida observes, in the non-dialectical aspect of the game, the “afar” (da) 
means “making disappear without return”: for the child, it belongs to the “game of death and 
not that of absence” (in Lambotte 525). And what is involved is the disappearance of the 
subject, with the likelihood of him not reappearing (Lambotte 523–4). It is for this reason that 
“going on” is vital, as Malone observes, echoing Pascal14: “Because in order not to die you 
must come and go, come and go, unless you happen to have someone who brings you food 
wherever you happen to be, like myself. And you can remain for two, three and even four 
days without stirring hand or foot […]” (Three Novels 225). Thus contrary to what life in the 
monad may suggest – being constantly served, while remaining motionless –, what 
continually drives the characters is this radical disquiet causing the come and go movement, 
showing the going “on” to be not the progression towards a goal but a movement emptied of 
any teleology or possible meaning: outside the realm of the “possible.” This fundamental 
relationship to the cut of the signifier enables Beckett to tear himself away from the risk 
represented by the melancholic identification with nothingness – with regards to the ego ideal 
– which can lead to suicide in an effort to complete the identification in the real. Here the 
“come and go” movement maintains a part that ek-sists, that continues to remain exterior. 
This operates at various levels in Beckett’s creation: on one level, the tormented relationships 
between the characters and, on another, the relationship to language in the act of creation.  
 
Immobility and Movement 
The characters are distributed in pairs, notably Hamm and Clov, who occupy the centre. Their 
fraught relationship inscribes a strong emotional tension. As Beckett pointed out, this play, by 
contrast with Waiting for Godot, is intended to “claw.”15 The indefinite nature of the waiting 
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for an end is unrelieved by the evocation of a hypothetical “Godot.” Hamm himself is the 
embodiment of the “refuge”, with its subjacent unbearable quality. Beckett points to the 
divergent role of these two characters: “They endure their ‘thing’ by projection away from it, 
Clov outwards towards going, Hamm inwards towards abiding” (in Harmon 22). This shows 
that, as a “pseudo-couple” (Three Novels 291), they do not complete each other on the 
imaginary level, but bring to light their radical incompatibility.  
 As regards the sparseness of the “refuge”, Clov’s role is to ensure the idea of a “world” 
and knowing. He thus provides an extension to Hamm, functioning like the Freudian spool: it 
is he who takes Hamm on a tour of the room – “Right round the world!” (Complete Dramatic 
Works 104) –, and gives news of what may be seen through the windows. The tension is 
manifest, on this level, in Clov’s violent reactions, pointing out the absence of any phallic 
register, a fact that he underscores by enumerating all the worldly objects that are 
disappearing: “bicycle-wheels” (96); “pap”; “nature” (97) or, more importantly, “pain-killer” 
(127). Rather than the non-existence of these things, what is important is the fact that Clov 
refuses to give them in language. This generates the meta-theatrical nature of the play, and the 
importance of speech: “Why this farce day after day?” (107); “What is there to keep me here? 
/ The dialogue” (120–1). 
 While Hamm remains stationary, Clov insistently declares – or threatens – he is about to 
leave.16 In his own productions, Beckett accentuated the tension and uncertainty created by 
the respective positions of Hamm and Clov. He states: “‘Clov has only one wish, to get back 
into his kitchen – that must always be evident, just like Hamm’s constant effort to stop him. 
This tension is an essential motif of the play’ (Berlin Diary).” (Theatrical Notebooks II 48). 
As Gontarski explains: “[…] Clov is now poised midway between Hamm and the doorway, 
midway between obligation and relief […].” (XVIII). This spatial aspect is accompanied by a 
moral one, whereby Clov reveals himself to be progressively more disobedient to Hamm’s 
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injunctions. However, the idea of providing a clear-cut solution is contrary to Beckett’s ethics 
and æsthetics, and his work on stage production enabled him to deepen this fundamental 
logic. This can be read in the light of the inclusion/exclusion relationship determined by the 
place of the a object in Lacan’s formula of the fantasy (S/    ◊a), and which Beckett describes in 
the terms “nec tecum nec sine te.”17 However Beckett’s undertaking goes beyond any will to 
give substance or credence to the imaginary construction but, rather, to reveal the profound 
distress it reveals, as caused by the underlying abyss whose existence the characters cannot 
ignore.  
Therefore, not only is the question of mutual dependency involved, but also the absence 
of any elsewhere, as Beckett explained in Berlin: “You’re not looking outside any more; Clov 
already knows there’s nothing there” (Theatrical Notebook XIX). Indeed, the “without” is also 
a “nothing there”, and the absence of any possible metaphysics or meta-language: “You’re on 
earth, there’s no cure for that!” (Complete Dramatic Works 118). Hamm’s exclamation is an 
expression of personal powerlessness, but it also points to a logical impossibility, as 
expressed in the following exchange: “HAMM: All right, be off. […] CLOV: I’m trying. […] 
Ever since I was whelped” (98). Movement on stage is expressive of an effort to inscribe 
existence in the phallic register and, at the same time, its impossibility, from a structural point 
of view: there is no elsewhere to the ever-present “here,” from which no exit exists. 
This back and forth movement between the characters is also manifest on the level of 
objects, in the case of Clov. The example of his action in relation to the windows is telling. 
Objects here do not confirm the existence of a material universe; they rather show up the 
latter’s absence. Not only are the windows – “perhaps” – as “blind” as Hamm, but they also 
serve as manifestly inadequate complements to Clov’s movements on stage. A series of 
actions unfolds: Clov looks at the windows (Complete Dramatic Works 92), takes the ladder 
to look through left window; goes to right window without the ladder, and has then to go back 
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for it. Conversely, he goes to the ashbins with the ladder, but has to set it down. The same sort 
of game occurs with the telescope (105), which Clov also deliberately lets fall (106). A form 
of dislocation – rather than a complementarity – affects Clov’s relationship to objects; the 
latter support his bodily movement as a form of artifice, with the aim as expressed by 
Vladimir in Waiting for Godot: “We always find something, eh Didi, to give us the 
impression we exist?” (64). This is why Clov needs to move in order to think: “[He starts 
pacing to and fro, his eyes fixed on the ground, his hands behind his back. He halts.] The 
pains in my legs! It’s unbelievable! Soon I won’t be able to think any more.” (Complete 
Dramatic Works 114–5). With regards to the “nightmare thingness” (Complete Short Prose 
69) that oppresses them, the characters’ actions offer the indispensible, vital simulacrum of 
going somewhere. Hamm exclaims: “We’re getting on.” (Complete Dramatic Works111); and 
when Clov questions him: “What’s the matter with you today? / I’m taking my course” (112). 
Hamm is “taking his course” as trying to continue the “farce” (107), but his very movement 
can only be at a certain remove from the all-enveloping “thing”; in the same way as 
Geulincx’s sailor is free to go back and forth on the deck of a boat whose movement he can in 
no way command (Three Novels 46). This means that the relationship between two signifiers 
opens up a possibility of continuing, establishing a discursive space – associated with an 
imaginary – bordering on the hole as other, in the impossibility of finding a grounding in 
phallic mediation.  
In his stage productions, Beckett accentuated the dissociation between movement and 
words. In Berlin, he advised: “‘Never let your changes of position and voice come together. 
First comes (a) the altered bodily stance; after it, following a slight pause, comes (b) the 
corresponding utterance’ (Berlin Diary)” (Theatrical Notebook II, XIX). 
The emotional tension between the characters is not the only aspect supported by the 
“come and go” movement, since the construction of the dialogues reveals the absence of 
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complementarity. Thus the terms associated with Hamm express a point of impossibility: 
“HAMM: I can’t leave you. / CLOV: I know. And you can’t follow me” (Complete Dramatic 
Works114). Hamm’s stasis is expressed by two negations: that of leaving – the term 
associated with Clov – and that of following. The hypothetical separation of the two 
characters would mean the possibility of creating a breach in the stifling continuum that 
envelops them. This exchange activates the inverted message which undercuts the verbal 
symmetry (leave/follow): Hamm cannot execute Clov’s projected action (leaving), neither can 
he hinder the latter. So while speaking of Hamm, both characters’ actions are evoked: by 
denegation, Hamm wants Clov to stay; Clov asserts his liberty to leave, while remaining 
motionless.  
Thus while complementarity would seem to be present – “It’s we are obliged to each 
other” (Complete Dramatic Works 132) –, it serves only to reveal a fundamental breach, as 
can be seen in the use of equivocation whereby, for example, Hamm questions Clov: “What? 
Neither gone nor dead? / In spirit only. / Which? / Both. / Gone from me you’d be dead. / And 
vice versa” (126). To one division (gone/dead), Clov adds another (body/spirit), and asserts 
the unity (both) of what Hamm had proposed as an alternative (neither). While Hamm had 
just settled into his solitude – telling his “chronicle” (121) in order to populate it –, he 
suddenly finds himself in the presence of Clov again, and expresses the wish for his absence. 
He suggests the two words might be equivalent, in the sense that for the melancholic, the 
disappearance entails a dimension of the real. This is expressed in A Piece of Monologue, 
where the alienation to the signifier resulting from birth remains present in any separation in 
life: “Never were other matters. […] From the word go. The word begone” (Complete 
Dramatic Works 429). In the latter sentence, one can only be by being gone which, owing to 
the differential principle inherent in the signifier, is not identical to the state of death (the 
absence of being).  
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This condition follows Lacan’s explanation of the signifying vel (Séminaire XI 192). 
However, the exchange breaks up the conflated terms, so that the two faces require to be 
expressly formulated, showing their lack of identity as the result of a fundamental cut. A 
causal dimension is revealed: going would entail death (spatial), and death would produce a 
form of going (spiritual or existential). Thus while the confusion of the two belongs to the 
imaginary register, the back and forth movement of the dialogue, based on equivocation, 
brings to the fore the dimension of hors sens which cannot be assimilated or reduced. It 
supposes the necessity of going around the edge of the cut, and taking it from one side and the 
other: completing a circuit. Thus the original vel of alienation can be caught up, in a second 
stage, in the movement of separation (Séminaire XI 195), following a binary logic (199). In 
this perspective, Lacan uses the lozenge-form poinçon (◊) – read as “desire for18” – to indicate 
the fundamental breach separating subject and objet a. The barred subject (S/ ) is a pure cut, 
and his alienation is represented in the upper half of the lozenge (∧), read as a retroactive 
arrow (indicating conjunction: both S/  and a). The lower half is disjunctive (∨), read as an 
arrow joining S/  and a, but excluding elements they do not have in common. In the light of the 
overlapping sets, the two sides remain unequal, since they only allow for “life” (as in the 
summons: “Your money or your life”), with the loss of one element. By contrast, “liberty or 
death” entails the loss of both. Earlier in Seminar XI, Lacan analysed the drive as a “come and 
go” (aller-et-retour; 162) circuit, where “aim” (trajectory) and “goal” remain distinct, 
ensuring the “self-erotic” function of completing the circuit. However, the latter can never be 
complete, and while the movement is accomplished around the cuts formed by the “erogenous 
zones19” or bodily orifices, there remains “a hollow, a void” (164) that can only be known by 
means of the a object which, consequently, is “of the order of the real20” (Séminaire XIII 6 
January 1966). 
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Thus the dialogues and the use of equivocation, in Endgame, point to the fact that “the 
conjunction of a real – the a object – with a reality (the fantasy) is a gaping hole (béance), the 
very hole of the imaginary and the real, that only the symbolic binds together according to the 
structure of the Borromean knot” (Regnault 44). These fleeting moments of humour hollow 
out rather than consolidate meaning, confirming the central idea of the play, as enounced by 
Nell: “Nothing is funnier than unhappiness […]” (Complete Dramatic Works 101). As Marie-
Hélène Brousse points out, the phallic register returns by means of laughter, revealing the 
incidence of lalangue. The latter, understood as “the integral of the equivocations” that the 
history of a language has allowed to persist (Autres écrits 490), manifests itself in the 
inexhaustible dimension that exceeds the cut. The difference that it embodies resides in the 
jouissance of saying: it cannot be named (see Milner, L’Amour de la langue 21–2), only 
observed in the effects it produces. In the case of Nell, it allows her to surprise the spectator 
by mocking unhappiness, rather than identifying with it in the fullness or adequacy of a tragic 
posture.  
 
The End… 
The play ends with Clov on the verge of leaving – or not… –, and Hamm remaining alone. As 
the central character, he is the heart of the “refuge”, and so the play folds in over him. The 
symbolic cut resulting from the succession of the generations has been excluded: Clov’s 
status as adoptive son remains uncertain21, and he is henceforth inaccessible to blind Hamm. 
However, while rejecting his “[a]ccursed progenitor” (Complete Dramatic Works 96), he 
situates himself symmetrically (almost) between two generations: “I’ll have called my father 
and I’ll have called my… [he hesitates] …my son” (126); and at the end, he calls 
successively: “Father!” then “Clov!” (133). His others – Clov/dog/man imploring22 – acted as 
so many Freudian “spools” for him, forming a single paradigmatic axis. For want of a set 
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place in transmission, he has to be himself his “own other” (Complete Dramatic Works 441), 
like an earlier narrator: “Yes, I was my father and I was my son, I asked myself questions and 
answered as best I could, I had it told to me evening after evening, the same old story I knew 
by heart and couldn’t believe […].” (Complete Short Prose 103). Finally, this function is 
delegated to his handkerchief: “Old stancher! [Pause.] You… remain.”23 (Complete Dramatic 
Works 134). The handkerchief functions as a comforting, maternal, enveloping (a) object 
(appearing as refuse, not as cause), replacing the tormented relationships with his others: 
along with the ashbins, it is a miniature version of the “refuge” itself as a self-contained 
monad. It appears as a derisory but necessary reduction to the strict minimum of all the others 
previously present, as well as of Hamm’s environment.24 It allows the latter to be silent:25 to 
cease making his voice resound in an effort to create a breach in the continual slipping of the 
“thing.” The refuge, like the handkerchief, provides a physical fixed point, for want of a 
subjective one: enveloping replaces framing; however, it also reveals the persistence of a cut 
that will never be effaced.  
 
Conclusion 
In Endgame, Beckett thus inscribes a cut in what seemed to be the irremediably continuous 
and closed structure of the monad. However, in any closed structure there must be an opening, 
in the same way as there needs to be one for the sack, which is its equivalent – and a central 
metaphor– in How It Is (Brown passim): the cut allows discourse to find its anchoring in a 
part that ek-sists.  
Indeed, as a literary composition, Endgame forms a discourse, in which the barred subject 
(S/ ) is grounded; it is what can be called a said (Lacan Autres écrits, 472), or an utterance, 
marked by its “closed cut.” The latter is the “ending”, the idea of which torments Hamm from 
the outset (Complete Dramatic Works 93), but which also leads to a point that is both hors 
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sens, and excluded from the symbolic. It is thus that, with regards to written art, of which 
Lacan states that “far from transforming reality in any possible way at all” (Séminaire VI 471) 
it “introduces in its very structure the advent of the cut, insofar as is manifested there the 
subject’s real, in that, beyond what he says, he is the unconscious subject.” 
The nature of the latter however is deepened in Lacan’s later teachings where he 
promotes the parlêtre or speaking being, as opposed to the subject. Indeed, as of Seminar XI, 
Lacan aimed to produce the subject – or the speaking being – as “absolute difference” 
(Seminar XI 248). This is later termed a “One alone” (Séminaire XIX 165; meaning: devoid of 
any Other) that is real. The latter belongs to the dimension not of the said, but of saying, as 
pointed to in the first part of Lacan’s sentence from “L’Étourdit” 26, where the subjunctive 
(qu’on dise) withholds the “saying” from any assertive value. This suspension of actualisation 
impedes the verb’s integration into a set grammatical realisation which, entailing its 
correlative the negation, would support the register of truth (Leray 453). Saying thus belongs 
to the register of existence, and not to being (Hamm’s being “there”). It testifies to the 
unceasing pulsation of the living, driven by the One-saying (Un-dire; Autres écrits 551), 
anchored in the real, and situated on the side of the creator. This however takes us away from 
the signifier and the cut, and opens up to the dimension of writing.  
It is doubtless the dimension of lalangue – extracted from discourse and beyond the cut –
that informs the play’s vivacity and humour (Brousse), along with the unbearable dimension 
of existence that it reveals. Jean-Claude Milner points out that the Borromean knot only holds 
together by virtue of a breach caused by the real, which causes the rings to fall apart (Noms 
indistincts 12–3). In psychoanalysis, the truth is a “real cut” which, bound to the symbolic, 
produces a “real nomination”, which also suspends the symbolic. But immediately, the breach 
closes over: “Nothing has taken place except that, in this nothing that separates a before from 
an after, to a subject, a real has happened” (Noms indistincts 15–6). From a real, nothing 
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ensues – in a symbolic or imaginary reutilisation, on the register of knowing (savoir)–except, 
as Milner points out in the writing of Thucydides and Lucretius, “the readers discover at each 
instant a given that they did not expect, that no previous experience allows them to deal with 
and from which, moreover, no knowing [savoir] follows. […] The plague will have taught me 
nothing, an Athenian survivor could say. Nothing, except the plague itself and that one can 
speak of it” (Relire la Révolution 241). Putting to work the signifier with its correlative cut, in 
the symbolic and discursive register, the actions and the dialogues of Endgame succeed 
producing a breach in the oppressive and mortifying situation of the “refuge”-monad. 
However, the play itself enables the spectator to hear, through its anchoring in lalangue, 
something of a real– the “plague” of existence – beyond knowing.  
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1“He said that Krapp is not a way of looking at the world (keine Weltanschauung), and that in fact answers 
everything. No, this is just Krapp, not a world-view.” (Hayman). 
2  On the political level, see Jean-Claude Milner’s analysis of the Revolution as a cut, as opposed to 
“Polybianism”, which aims at maintaining an equilibrium (Relire la Révolution 81–3).  
3Picardy “‘et plus précisément dans le Boulonnais…alentours de Wissant’ […] ‘Votre habitation, édifiée sur la 
falaise, comporte un living room et un couloir transformé en cuisine’ […].” (“and more precisely in the 
Boulonnais region… in the environs of Wissant”; “Your inhabitation, edified on the cliff, includes a living room 
and a corridor converted into a kitchen”; Theatrical Notebook 43). 
4“This reference to Clov’s activity outside the shelter was cut by Beckett in Berlin. With this cut, the only 
reference to Clov’s external activity is eliminated, and of course, the likeliness of Clov’s actually leaving Hamm 
is diminished.” (Theatrical Notebook 53).  
5Letter to Alec Reid, 17 January 1956 (Letters of Samuel Beckett 596).  
6Beckett in Harmon, p. 23. 
7“One purpose of the image is to suggest the impossibility logically, i.e. eristically, of the “thing” ever coming to 
an end. […] In other words the impossibility of a catastrophe.” (Beckett in Harmon 23).  
8 Gérard Wajcman explains how the English term does not include any notion of a view: it refers simply an air-
vent (Fenêtre 26–7).  
9 It thus forms the ego ideal (Lacan Écrits 808).  
10“It is as if he [the melancholic subject] affirmed castration in the real without it being possible for him to 
partially displace it and to go about things in such a way as it does not occult all the imaginary field of projects 
and hopes” (Lambotte, Discours 610–1).  
11 In the singular, referring to Clov (in Harmon 22).  
12 Lacan, Écrits 819. It is different from the letter since, being pure difference, it is without positivity (Milner, 
L’Œuvre claire 128). “Everything that concerns the signifier will be said in a vocabulary of the chain and 
alterity; reduced to its skeleton, it is summed up by S1 (a signifier), S2 (another signifier); S/  (the subject barred 
by the beating of S1 to S2); a (what falls under the effect of the bar).” (Milner, L’Œuvre claire 130).  
13Séminaire XVII 202. This remark concerns the upper line. 
14“Notre nature est dans le mouvement ; le repos entier est la mort.” (“Our nature is in movement; complete rest 
is death.” Pascal 126; quoted by Weber-Caflisch 17). 
15Beckett describes the play: “Rather difficult and elliptic, mostly depending on the power of the text to claw, 
more inhuman than Godot” (in Harmon 11).  
16Complete Dramatic Works 95, 97, 110, 111, 131. 
17Letter to Alan Schneider, 19 December 1957 (in Harmon 24).  
18 Lacan, Écrits 774. We follow the development by François Regnault (26–7). The poinçon also points to any 
possible relationship with the other term. 
19Lacan, Écrits, op.cit. 817. 
20 Lacan, Séminaire XIII, “L’objet de la psychanalyse”, 6 January 1966.  
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21 Regarding the paternal function, Clov says to Hamm: “You were that to me.” (Complete Dramatic Works 
110). The reciprocal is also true, as Beckett states: “‘Son’ can have an ironic touch instead. What is meant here is 
that which has served me as a son.” (Theatrical Notebooks 65, note to line 1249). 
22 Beckett had Clov adopt the same posture as the dog (Theatrical Notebooks II, 59, note to line 744).  
23 Ludovic Janvier (135) notes the same sentence in How It Is. 
24It appears again later, as the “cloth” in Nacht und Träume (Complete Dramatic Works 465). Compare with: 
“The layers of Damask fused and drawn to the uttermost layer, silken blade. Blind and my mind a blade of silk, 
blind and music and whiteness facts in the fact of my mind.” (Dream of Fair to middling Women 182). 
25“Asked if Hamm covers his face in order to die, Beckett responded, ‘No, only in order to be more silent’ 
(Berlin Diary)” (Theatrical Notebooks II, 71; note to line 1500).  
26“Qu’on dise reste oublié derrière ce qui se dit dans ce qui s’entend.” (Autres écrits 449).  
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